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Abstract: While the evidential problem of evil has been enormously 
influential within the contemporary philosophical literature—William 
Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of 
Atheism” being the most seminal—no academic research has explored what 
cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of pointlessness in 
target examples of suffering. In this exploratory paper, we show that the 
perception of pointlessness in the target examples of suffering that 
underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil is contingent 
on the absence of broader context. In other words, we show that when such 
suffering is presented alongside broader contextual information, the 
appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly diminishes. In §1 we 
briefly elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil and the 
thought experiment that motivates a key premise. In §2 and §3 respectively, 
we briefly explain our hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods 
for testing these hypotheses. In §4, we elucidate our results, and in §5 we 
explore some of the philosophical implications of our findings and gesture 
towards some areas for future research. Finally, in §6, we briefly connect our 
research to some of the established philosophical literature on suffering and 
narrative before concluding.  
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“To live is to suffer, to survive is to find some meaning in the suffering.” 
Gordon W. Allport1  
 
Within the contemporary philosophical literature, suffering that appears pointless 
is often taken to be an evidential challenge for theism. After all, if there is a God 
(traditionally conceived), then, plausibly, we wouldn’t expect there to be genuinely 
pointless suffering. But it sure looks like there are instances of genuinely pointless 
suffering in our world, so that seems to give us a reason to doubt that there is a God 
(so conceived). To be sure, an instance of suffering might appear pointless without 
necessarily being pointless, but we might plausibly expect that if something appears 
pointless that that gives us some evidence for thinking that it is pointless; but as 
such, if we have some evidence for thinking that target suffering is pointless, then 
surely that gives us some evidence against traditional brands of theism.  
While such arguments have been enormously influential within the 
contemporary philosophical literature—William Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The 
Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism” being the most seminal—no 
academic research has explored what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the 
appearance of pointlessness in target examples of suffering.2 Does our inability to 
see a point to suffering really give us evidence for thinking that there is no point?3 
Or might the appearances of pointlessness be underwritten by cognitive 
mechanisms that are far more subjective and ethereal than we might have previously 
expected?4 In this exploratory paper, we show that the perception of pointlessness 
in the target examples of suffering that underwrite Rowe’s seminal formulation of 
the problem of evil is contingent on the absence of broader context. In other words, 
 
1 From the preface to Viktor Frankl’s Man’s Search for Meaning (1985, 11). 
2 Rowe’s argument was, of course, developed further in later work—see for example, Rowe, 
1996—but we’re not suggesting that this article is the final word on the problem of evil. Instead, we’re 
taking this formulation to be one of the most seminal and the most influential variations of the 
problem in the academic literature, which it surely is.  
3 For more on this question, see Plantinga (2000, 465–469). 
4 For more on how empirical research might be applied to the problem of evil, see Church, Carlson, 
and Barrett (2020).  
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we show that when such suffering is presented alongside broader contextual 
information, the appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly diminishes. 
In §1 we briefly elucidate Rowe’s formulation of the problem of evil  and the 
thought experiment that motivates a key premise. In §2 and §3 respectively, we 
briefly explain our hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods for testing 
these hypotheses. In §4, we elucidate our results, and in §5 we explore some of the 
philosophical implications of our findings and gesture towards some areas for 
future research. Finally, in §6, we briefly connect our research to some of the 
established philosophical literature on suffering and narrative before concluding.  
 
2. Rowe’s Formulation of the Problem of Evil 
 
In William Rowe’s seminal version of the problem of evil, he levels the following 
argument against theism:  
 
1. There exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient 
being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or 
permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
2. An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any 
intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing 
some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.  
3. [Therefore,] there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good 
being. (1979, 336) 
 
Like Rowe, let’s use the following shorthand when discussing this argument: an 
instance of suffering is pointless if allowing it to happen doesn’t either afford some 
greater good or prevent some other evil equally bad or worse. And let’s just assume 
that God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient. With this in mind, we can 
roughly rephrase the argument like this:  
 
4. There exists pointless suffering. 
5. If there is a God, then there won’t be pointless suffering.  
6. Therefore, there is no God.  
 
Of course, given that such an argument is valid, if the premises are true then the 
conclusion must be true. But why should we think that the premises are true? 
Premise 2 (or 5) seems fairly unobjectionable, indeed, as Rowe notes, “This premise 
(or something not too distant from it) is, I think, held in common by many atheists 
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and nontheists” (1979, 336). And while Rowe gives some good reasons to think that 
something like premise 2 (or 5) is true, we don’t need to worry about this too much 
here; for this paper, our focus will be on premise 1 (or premise 4).  
So why should we think, as premise 1 states, that there “exists instances of intense 
suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without 
thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse”? 
Here Rowe has us think about an example of what seems like a good candidate for 
a pointless evil, in the form of a brief vignette:  
 
FAWN: Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting 
in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in 
terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. (1979, 337) 
 
According to Rowe, “so far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless” 
(1979, 337). While an omnipotent, omniscient, all–good being certainly could have 
prevented such an event, it’s extremely difficult to imagine how permitting 
something like the suffering of FAWN could either prevent a greater evil from 
occurring or might usher in some greater good. As such, premise 1 looks plausible.  
But, as Rowe is quick to note, this doesn’t amount to a proof. For all we can tell, 
there is a greater evil that allowing FAWN prevents or perhaps there is a greater 
good that allowing FAWN affords. The problem, as Rowe sees it, is that given “our 
experience and knowledge of the variety and profusion of suffering in our world” it 
sure seems like evils like those manifest in FAWN are wholly avoidable and more 
or less pointless; and while the above argument doesn’t amount to a proof, it does, 
according to Rowe, provide “rational support for atheism, that it is reasonable for 
us to believe that the theistic God does not exist” (1979, 338, emphasis ours).5 
Critically, it’s our intuitions regarding cases like FAWN that are the driving force 
for thinking that premise 1 (4) is true.6 As Alvin Plantinga elucidates Rowe’s 
argument in Warranted Christian Belief (2000), if it seems as though the suffering in 
cases like FAWN are pointless, then that gives us a reason for thinking that the 
suffering in cases like FAWN are pointless; and insofar as we have evidence for 
thinking that the suffering in cases like FAWN are pointless, then that will give us 
evidence against theism (given Rowe’s argument;  465–466). As such, if we don’t 
think that the suffering in cases like FAWN are pointless, contrary to Rowe, then the 
 
5 That said, it is somewhat unclear precisely how much evidential weight Rowe ascribes to his 
argument. For a fuller consideration of the array of possible interpretations, see Wykstra (1996). 
6 That’s not to say that everything hangs on the FAWN case in particular, but that FAWN can 
serve as an archetypal case of purportedly pointless suffering.  
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evidence in favor of thinking that premise 1 (4) is true greatly diminishes. And if our 
evidence in favor of thinking that premise 1 (4) is greatly diminished, then, as Rowe 
rightly acknowledges, the evidence the argument generates against theism greatly 
diminishes too.  
 
3. Hypothesis  
 
We predicted that the way the target example of suffering (FAWN) is presented—
namely, in a brief vignette—would have a significant impact on perception of 
pointlessness.  In other words, we predicted that manipulating the context (high vs. 
low) of Rowe’s FAWN vignette will have a significant effect on the participant's level 
of agreement with Rowe’s conclusion that the suffering is pointless and no greater 
evil is prevented and no greater good is accomplished. Specifically, it is hypothesized 
that the high context group will show less agreement with Rowe in comparison to the control 
group.  
We also tested a range of ancillary hypotheses aimed at exploring how 
agreement with Rowe’s intuitions might vary across demographics and what factors 
are contributing to the target philosophical intuitions (e.g. the cuteness of the animal, 
the inclusion of a picture of the animal). For the purposes of this paper, however, we 
won’t focus on these results; we only mention these ancillary hypotheses to help 
explain our experiment design.  
 
4. Methodology  
 
To investigate these questions, we developed an experimental study with a 2x2x3 
between–subjects factorial design. 1,506 participants were recruited from Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk online workforce. After completing an informed consent form, 
participants provided demographic information including: age, gender, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation, nationality, income, and education level. Participants then read 
Rowe’s vignette of the fawn from the 1979 paper. Participants were presented with 
the vignette in one of several manners. To half of the participants the vignette was 
accompanied by a description of the role of wildfires in a forest ecosystem to provide 
context to the suffering. This description, approximately a paragraph in length, 
discussed the role occasional, small forest fires have in the health of the ecosystem 
by clearing away dead organic material and helping the forest recovery by leaving 
behind a topsoil dense in organic materials.7 The other half of the participants read 
 
7 The high context paragraph read as follows:  
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the vignette without context, just as it appeared in Rowe’s 1979 paper. The subject 
of the vignette varied as either a fawn, a boar, or a vulture. Finally, in half of the 
cases a picture of the subject of the vignette accompanied the vignette. Thus, this 
experiment contained three variables: context (high or low), picture (picture or no 
picture), and animal (fawn, boar, or vulture).  
After reading the vignette, participants rated several statements designed to 
assess their degree of agreement or disagreement with Rowe’s intuition that the 
suffering described in the vignette is pointless. These statements read, “The story 
you just read is an example of pointless suffering,” “Some equal or greater evil could 
have been prevented because of the situation in the story,” and “Some equal or 
greater good could be accomplished because of the situation in the story.” 
Participants responded on a 7 point Likert scale ranging from 1, Strongly Disagree 
to 7, strongly agree. We initially intended to measure the degree to which 
participants shared Rowe’s intuitions through an index compiled of the score of 
these three statements, however, we found that whereas scores of the last two 
questions were highly correlated (r = .478, p < 0.01) the first question was not highly 
correlated in the expected direction with the last two questions (r = .071,  p < 0.01 and 
 
Forest fires are often viewed as some of the most dangerous and destructive natural 
disasters. While some fires of catastrophic size can be detrimental to forests and endanger 
human lives and infrastructure, smaller forest fires are actually an essential aspect of the 
forest ecosystem. It may seem counterintuitive that fires could be beneficial to the life of a 
forest, however, recent ecological research has shown that small burns play a major role in 
the health of an ecosystem as a whole. Fires, often resulting from lightning strikes, quickly 
and efficiently clear away thick undergrowth, dying trees, and the dead material that 
congregates on the forest floor. If left unchecked, dead organic material and undergrowth 
will prevent new trees and plants from taking root and being able to grow. The burnt organic 
material such as plants, shrubs, and animals, leave behind topsoil that is rich in nutrients 
from which new plant life can easily grow. Small forest fires also play an important role in 
preventing fires from reaching catastrophic sizes. When a fire is small, it is usually confined 
to burning the undergrowth and dead material on the forest floor and does not burn the tree 
canopy or kill the large trees of the forest. However, if a forest goes too long without a fire, 
the undergrowth will become so thick that when it does burn it will easily ignite not only the 
forest floor but also the trees themselves. Many experts attribute the record–setting fires that 
have been seen in recent years to decades of fire suppression in forests, which has left entire 
ecosystems vulnerable to catastrophic fires. Many species of plants have adapted to 
occasional fires and can quickly regrow burnt branches. Some trees even need fire to 
reproduce due to seed–cones that will only open when exposed to extreme temperature. 
Now, suppose in a distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the 
fire a wild [Insert Animal Here] is trapped, horribly burned, lies in terrible agony for several 
days before death relieves its suffering. 
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r = –.171, , p < 0.01). Therefore, we measured agreement with Rowe through an index 
of the reverse scored second and third questions.8 Finally, the participants answered 
questions about their intuitions concerning pointlessness and suffering more 
broadly and about how often the butchered or killed animals for food. 
 
5. Results  
  
Demographics: After excluding participants who failed attention checks, rushed 
through the survey (in under 90 seconds), or abandoned the survey (left more than 
10% of the survey incomplete), we had a sample size of n = 1,506. Of these 476 where 
female, 1,014 were male, 16 had another gender identity. The sample consisted of 
846 White participants, 363 Asian participants, 146 Black or African American 
participants, 105 Hispanic participants, and 46 participants belonging to other 
ethnicities. 201 participants were agnostic, 161 atheist, 464 Catholic, 261 Hindu, 181 
Protestant, 100 were another denomination of Christian, and 138 participants 
reported another religious affiliation. 4 participants had a 9th grade education or 
less, 117 participants had a high school education or G.E.D., 158 had some college or 
specialized training, 82 had associates degrees, 899 had Bachelor’s degrees, 246 had 
a Master’s degree or higher.  
Experimental Results: A two way ANOVA (analysis of variance) examining the 
influence of three independent variables, animals on the dependent variable of 
agreement with Rowe was conducted and yielded significant results (F(11) = 11.37, 
p < 0.001). The main effects of the type of animal or the presence of a picture were 
not significant, however, the main effect of context was significant (F(1) = 114.303, p 
< 0.001). No interaction effects were statistically significant. A series of one–way 
ANOVAs were planned if the two–way ANOVA yielded significant results. Among 
these, two were significant, the comparison between the low context fawn group 
with no picture, and the high context fawn group with a picture (t(221.20) = 4.535, p 
< 0.001) as well as the comparison between the Fawn low context group with no 
picture and the fawn high context group with no picture (t(210.52) = 4.659, p < 0.001). 




8 Given that Rowe uses “pointlessness” as a shorthand for not bringing about a greater good or 
preventing a greater evil, it makes sense to prioritize the second and third items on this index, given 
that the second and third items correlate with each other but not with the first item; however, that 
said, it’s worth noting that using the three item index or the just first item would not radically change 
our results.  




It is worth noting that in the above results, a score of 8 represents a midpoint of 
neither agreeing or disagreeing with Rowe. Anything above 8 (up to a maximum of 
14) represents agreement with Rowe on average. Anything below 8 (to a minimum 
of 2) represents disagreement with Rowe on average. To be sure, as one referee 
noted, such a result should be viewed with a proverbial grain of salt; many of the 
theists (the vast majority of the participants) might be strongly motivated to disagree 
with Rowe’s intuition at the outset, which might skew the average results.9 That said, 
given that studies have shown that nonreligious demographics are generally 
overrepresented in MTurk (see Lewis et al. 2015), the above results might actually 
be significantly elevated when compared to the general population. In any case, one 
of the most striking findings is just how little agreement there was with Rowe’s 




9 And Church, Warchol, and Barrett did indeed find significant variation in responses to Rowe’s 
case according to subjects’ reported religion.  
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6. Philosophical Implications and Future Research 
 
As predicted, our empirical research has shown that the perception of pointlessness 
in Rowe’s FAWN case seems highly contingent on the absence of broader context. 
In other words, when the When FAWN vignette is accompanied by a paragraph 
elucidating broader context—including information about forest fires, when and 
why they occur, etc.—the appearance of pointlessness, on average, significantly 
diminishes. Such a result might not seem that surprising. Of course an example of 
suffering will seem pointless in the absence of context—points are found in the 
context! Such a results might seem exactly right to theists and useful for defusing 
this seminal formulation of the problem of evil; however, more research is needed 
before we can draw any firm conclusions.   
To be sure, on the one hand, such a result might raise some important questions 
about the ultimate success of Rowe’s seminal formulation of the problem of evil, 
since it might suggest that Rowe’s response to FAWN might be underwritten by 
cognitive mechanisms/influences that are not as objective as we might have 
previously hoped.10 What is more, given that the inclusion of context significantly 
diminishes the appearance of pointlessness, we might think that such a result would 
reduce our confidence that intuitions regarding a contextless FAWN should be 
theory–guiding. Insofar as we have no reason to think that we should champion 
intuitions regarding contextless cases, the theoretical import of Rowe’s intuition 
regarding the FAWN case would be significantly undermined. Given such a 
conclusion, the amount of evidence afforded by such an intuition would also be 
significantly diminished. And if our evidence in favor of thinking that FAWN is 
truly an example of pointless suffering is significantly diminished, then, as we noted 
in §1, our central evidence in favor of thinking that premise 1(4) is true would 
likewise be significantly diminished. And, again, if our evidence in favor of thinking 
that premise 1(4) is greatly diminished, then the evidence the argument generates 
against theism would greatly diminish too. 
On the other hand, however (as both referees rightly pointed out), we might 
legitimately worry that the selected “context” (see footnote 7) effectively sneaks in a 
theodicy—effectively nudging participants away from Rowe’s conclusion. Maybe 
the context we provided was too positively value laden, and maybe the observed 
effect would diminish with neutral or even negative context. Similarly, we’ll need to 
explore what kinds of context are most salient for diminishing the perception of 
 
10 Indeed, drawing from additional empirical resources, this is precisely the point that Church, 
Warchol, and Barrett argue for in, “Pointless Suffering? The Problem of Evil and Experimental 
Philosophy of Religion.”  
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pointlessness. Does context from a proverbial God’s eye or “cosmic” perspective—
perhaps suggesting that there’s more to the world than our limited impressions—
have a particularly significant impact on reducing the appearance of pointlessness? 
Or is context of a more “terrestrial” sort every bit as impactful? What about context 
that simply highlights all of what we don’t know about the situation (as a nod to the 
skeptical theist)? Along all of these lines, more research is needed.  
Additionally, we might have good reason to doubt that intuitions afforded by 
examples of suffering that include broader context are ultimately veritic; as such, 
Rowe’s argument might not be threatened by the shift in intuitions between cases 
with context and those without context. Humans seem to be strongly inclined to find 
patterns in nature, even when no such patterns exist—this is the well–documented 
phenomenon called pareidolia. Perhaps, then, the decrease in perceived pointlessness 
in cases that are accompanied by context is attributable to people finding “points” 
or patterns when there are none. Perhaps Rowe’s FAWN vignette is intuitively such 
a powerful example of pointless suffering because it doesn’t provide much by way of 
background information or context. Sure as more context is provided—as we talked 
about the health of forest ecosystems, how occasional, small forest fires often 
promote a healthier ecosystem by burning the underbrush and delivering nutrients 
to the soil, how many people groups around the world have used controlled burns 
to replenish forests for millennia, etc.—then Rowe’s FAWN does not seem nearly as 
pointless to lots of people (as we saw above). But a defender of Rowe might argue 
that that’s not because the broader context provided the explanation or the “point” 
to the suffering; instead, they might argue that the broader context provides the 
necessary resources pareidolia needs to (mistakenly) find patterns and explanations 
to provide the illusion of a “point” to the suffering.11 If you give people “junk” 
context that clearly has nothing to do with the target suffering, will we still see a 
marked decrease in perceived pointlessness—perhaps signaling that people are just 
prone to imagining a point whenever there’s a sufficient amount of context (even if 
that context is irrelevant to the suffering)?  
 
7. Context and Narrative 
 
Interestingly, the importance of context for the problem of evil dovetails nicely with 
Eleonore Stump’s seminal work on the role narrative can play in shaping our 
 
11 Alternatively, maybe the contexts simply distracts participants from the target suffering. As one 
referee noted, maybe it’s not so much that subjects are finding patterns where there aren’t any, maybe 
it has more to do with swamping participants with information that keeps them from focusing on the 
suffering in the right way. This is another possibility that further research will need to explore.  
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knowledge of God and our experience of suffering. In Eleonore Stump's landmark 
work Wandering in Darkness (2012) and her article “The Problem of Evil: Analytic 
Philosophy and Narrative” (2011), she argues that narrative has an essential role to 
play in our understanding of the problem of evil. She’s critical of overly narrow 
conceptions of analytic philosophy—which has, by Stump’s lights, over–
emphasized knowledge that can be expressed in terms of propositional content—
and she suggests that narrative in particular can be extremely useful for revealing 
and developing important philosophical insights. In particular, Stump argues that 
narrative can help us grow in our knowledge of persons in a way that formal 
discursive writing never could. This puts her view in sharp contrast to Rowe’s two–
sentence vignette.  
And while we won’t have time to seriously engage with her view here, it’s worth 
noting that it certainly seems plausible. As Roald Dahl aptly put it, when describing 
his character Matilda in the book Matilda (originally published in 1988) as a 
voracious reader:  
 
The books transported [Matilda] into new worlds and introduced her to amazing 
people who lived exciting lives. She went on olden–day sailing ships with Joseph 
Conrad. She went to Africa with Ernest Hemingway and to India with Rudyard 
Kipling. She traveled all over the world while sitting in her little room in an English 
village.” (2016 edition, 15) 
 
This knowledge of persons via narrative is important, according to Stump, because 
it is through narrative—and not just discursive theological or philosophical 
writing—that we can have knowledge of God, in particular, knowledge of God in 
God’s personhood.  
According to Stump, we can become more or less adroit at reading and engaging 
with narratives, we can be better or worse at gaining personal knowledge (that is, 
knowledge of persons) via narrative. As Stump explains,  
 
How much of what can be known in a second–person experience is made available 
to others to learn by means of a story depends in part on the artistry of the story–
teller. Harlequin romances no doubt give us something; the world’s great literature, 
drama, and film give us much more. It is, of course, clear that the degree of 
transmission of knowledge through stories is also a function of the sensitivity of the 
story reader (or listener or watcher). Some people are more natively gifted than 
others in their ability to learn from second–person experiences and from narratives. 
Furthermore, sensitivity of this sort, like perceptual sensitivity, can be trained. The 
ability to hear a key change in a piece of music is a function not just of native aural 
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acuity but also of musical training. An untrained ear will take in the sounds of 
Lutoslawski’s Cello Concerto but not hear it. In the same way, native sensibility and 
training each make a difference to one’s ability to understand and learn from 
narratives. (2011, 259–60) 
 
If we never engage with great narratives of second–person experiences—in 
particular, perhaps, great literature that engages the evil that so frequently 
permeates the human experience—then, on this view, we will be intellectually and 
perhaps even emotionally impoverished when we experience evil and suffering in 
our own lives. As Stump notes, “The Book of Job is commonly taken by theologians 
and philosophers as having the problem of evil as its central concern.” However, 
(and this is particularly telling) the answer given to the problem of evil in the Book 
of Job—if you can call it an answer—is notoriously unsatisfying if you’re looking for 
a response you can easily express in propositional terms or formalize into refutation 
to the problem of evil as expressed in the contemporary academic literature (2011, 
258). That’s not what the Book of Job is meant to give us. As Stump rightly notices, 
the Book of Job “concludes with the lengthiest face–to–face discourse between God 
and a human being anywhere in the biblical texts” (2011, 258). As such, she notes 
that “One way to read the book, then, is to see it as recommending second–person 
experience as a solution to the problem of evil. On this way of understanding the 
book, knowledge of a person is also an efficacious way to satisfy the desire to know 
generated by reflection on suffering” (2011, 258). 
This is a revolutionary idea. And while her appeals to narrative are far more 
nuanced than simply providing more context (as we tried to do in our study), it’s 
worth noting that Stump’s proposal raises some extremely interesting empirical 
questions that might build off of our findings. For example, does one’s exposure (or 
lack thereof) to great literature, or narratives of second–person experiences that 
wrestle with the problem of evil, provide requisite context for suffering such that it 
affects how someone understands and perceives the evils they experience in this 
world. Will someone who has read, say, The Book of Job, The Brothers Karamazov, The 
Divine Comedy, Moby Dick, Paradise Lost, or William Faulkner’s Sanctuary process evil 
and the challenges it poses differently from someone, say, who’s cognitive and 
contextual resources for thinking about evil primarily came from watching cable 
news and sitcoms on television. Maybe so. Plausibly, the person who has wrestled 
with these great works of literature, these great narratives, might be able to imagine 
that there could be reasons for the evil (or context for the suffering) they experience 
that are beyond their cognitive reach, or maybe they’ll be able to better imagine how 
the evil they experience is, in many ways, bigger than themselves. In contrast, 
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however, we might plausibly think that an individual whose conceptual resources 
for addressing evil were primarily shaped by the narratives afforded by aspirational 
television, say, will see the evils they experience as more outrageous and 
unconscionable. Perhaps the relevance of context for suffering extends beyond a 
particular vignette; perhaps our ability to see a point to suffering will be provided 
by the context of one’s life, by the contextual richness afforded by narrative from 
both personal and second–person experiences. This raises additional empirical 
questions that are certainly worth exploring. Indeed, given that the rise in 
prominence of the problem of evil within academic literature corresponds with 
deteriorating engagement with literature and the advent of mass entertainment, 
such a project could even plausibly explain why the problem of evil rose to 
prominence when it did.  
Alternatively, perhaps the rise in prominence of the problem of evil doesn’t have 
anything to do with the advent of mass entertainment, but everything to do with the 
rise in broad, scientific literacy, or perhaps the proliferation of robust narratives that 
are less friendly to theism. Charles Darwin’s theorizing—telling a new, scientific 
“story” about the how the diverse array of life we find in the world came to be—
seems to lead some people away from theistic ways of thinking about evil, because 
it provided alternative, non–theistic ways of thinking about the apparent order and 
purpose that people commonly perceive in the natural world. Looking back to a 
point we made in section 5, what if we provided people with narratives and context 
that are less friendly to theism (or at least not pro–theism)? Would such 
context/narratives still reduce the perception of pointlessness? Or might it have the 
opposite effect? Again, more research is needed.  
Relatedly, psychological research has shown that people have strong, natural 
predilections to view the world as value–laden and full of purpose.12 At a very early 
age, children seem drawn to teleological explanations for features of the world. 
“Why are the rocks pointy? So that animals won’t sit on them and smash them!” 
These teleological explanations are often unreliable, and scientists have to learn how 
to resist giving teleological explanations in their attempts to better understand the 
causal nature of the world.13 As such, we might wonder if any divergence in 
intuitions regarding the problem of evil can be at least partially explained in terms 
of people reverting back to a value–laden, teleological picture of the world as they 
seek to explain the suffering and evil we find in the world; perhaps scientific training 
(or scientific narratives) affords people with a more unflinching “context” on the 
 
12 See Rose & Schaffer (2017) and Rose & Nichols (2020).  
13 It is worth noting, however, that even trained scientists will revert to giving teleological 
explanations when under pressure. See, for example, see Kelemen, Rottman, and Seston (2013). 
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situation and a more sober explanation of the variety of evil and suffering we 




In this exploratory paper, we considered one of the most seminal formulations of 
the problem of evil within the contemporary philosophical literature—William 
Rowe’s 1979 formulation in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism”—
and reflected on what cognitive mechanisms might underwrite the appearance of 
pointlessness in target examples of suffering. We showed that the perception of 
pointlessness in the target example of suffering that underwrites Rowe’s seminal 
formulation of the problem of evil seems to be contingent on the absence of broader 
context. In other words, we showed that should such suffering be presented 
alongside some broader contextual information, the appearance of pointlessness, on 
average, seems to significantly diminish.  In §1 we briefly elucidated Rowe’s 
formulation of the problem of evil. In §2 and §3, we briefly explained our 
hypothesis regarding Rowe’s case and our methods for testing these hypotheses. In 
§4, we elucidated our results, and in §5 we explored some of the philosophical 
implications of our findings and gestured towards some areas for future research. 
Finally, in §6, we briefly connect our research to some of the established 
philosophical literature on suffering and narrative.   
The evidential problem of evil is frequently cited as the most serious challenge 
facing theism in the contemporary philosophical literature. What we’re beginning 
to see, however, is that it’s not a purely philosophical problem; there are empirical 
questions that surround the problem of evil that must be addressed. Suffering that 
is perceived to be pointless is often seen as providing an evidential challenge for 
theism; however, as our research has shown, the perception of the suffering as 
pointless seems to be highly contingent upon whether or not the target example of 
suffering is accompanied with broader context—cases of suffering without context 
being more likely to be seen as “pointless” than cases that include some background 
context. Though the ramifications of such a finding are far–reaching, further 
research is needed before we can determine what final conclusions to draw. As we 
noted, such a result could significantly undermine Rowe’s seminal formulation of 
the problem of evil; perhaps the only reason Rowe’s thought experiment seems like 
a quintessential example of pointless suffering is because it is contextless, perhaps 
the “points” are found in the context. That said, such a result might also force us to 
inquire further into why context plays such a profound role in the appearance of 
pointlessness; is it because “points” are genuinely found in the context or is it only 
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because humans are wired to find explanations and causal connections and, if given 
enough context, will imagine a connection or a “point” even when one isn’t there? 
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